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CASES NOTED
TAXATION - TRANSFER OF MARITAL RIGHTS IN PROPERTY
EFFECTED BY COURT DECREE NOT SUBJECT
TO FEDERAL GIFT TAX
Petitioner and her spouse, contemplating a divorce, entered into a set-
tlement agreement stating that the transfers pursuant thereto were to be in
complete satisfaction and to act as a waiver thereby of any rights that either
might have in the estate of the other. The parties received a Nevada
divorce that incorporated the settlement agreement in its terms. A gift tax'
was assessed on the transfer by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Held, a transfer, pursuant to a voluntary settlement agreement, later incor-
porated in a divorce decree, whereby each spouse waives marital rights in
the other's estate, is not taxable as a gift. Harris v. Commissioner, 71 Sup.
Ct. 181 (1950).
The phrase "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth" has been set up by Congress as the measuring stick to gauge whether
or not a particular transfer is a taxable gift.2 Does the relinquishment by
voluntary agreement of the marital rights in the spouse's estate beyond
normal support constitute such "adequate and full consideration . . ."?
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has contended that it does not in any
situation,s and the courts have nodded assent almost unanimously when
there are no complicating factors such as a subsequent divorce involved.
4
In a situation where there is a subsequent divorce decree incorporating
the agreement, either by reference or in its terms, there is a conflict in the
courts.3 The majority view, followed by the Tax Court regularly0 and the
Circuit Courts periodically, 7 states that as long as the agreement is reached
at "arm's length" and seems to be a good bargain for the transferor, the
divorce decree will make it a legal obligation and a transfer pursuant thereto
will not be taxable as a gift.8 Disapproval of this view has been evidenced
by regular dissents in the Tax Court9 and occasional holding in the Circuit
Courts.10 The rationale of Commissioner v. Wemyss" and Merrill v. Com-
inissioner Fahs2 underlies these cases in not considering such relinquishment
1. TNT. REV. CODE § 1000 et seq.
2. ITN. REv. Cona § 1002.
3. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8; E,', 19, 1946-2 CU M. BULL. 166.
4. Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945);
Cornm'r v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (Ist Cir. 1941).
5. See 36 VA. L. REv. 106 (1950).
6. Harding v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 1051 (1948); McLean v. Comrn'r, 11 T.C. 543
(19 48); Mitchell v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 159 (19461; Lahti v. Commn'r, 6 T.C. 7 (1946).
7. Cornm'r v. Converse, 163 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1947); Lasker v. Comrn'r, 138 F.2d
989 (7th Cir. 1943).
8. Comrnm'r v. Converse, supra note 7; Jones v. Comm'r, I T.C. 1207 (1943).
9. See Harding v. Comm'r, supra note 6, at 1057; McLean v. Commn'r, supra note 6,
at 550; Lahti v. Comm'r, supra note 6, at 9.
10. Comrn'r v. Bamard's Estate, 176 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949); Hooker v. Connin'r,
174 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949).
11. Supra note 4.
12. Supra note 4.
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of marital rights as "adequate and full consideration..." and thus subjecting
them to the gift tax."3
The instant case, 1' which follows the majority view,'5 is the first case
on this point that has been decided by the Supreme Court. The Court
reasoned that this was merely an intelligent way of settling their respective
estates with adequate consideration on each side and not a scheme to evade
either gift or estate taxes. Consequently, the divorce decree converted it
into a legal obligation, the satisfaction of which could not be considered as
a taxable gift. However, evidence of a minority viewpoint was recognized
in the strong dissent of four Justices. 16
This decision may very well crystallize the law on this subject. How-
ever, a very small change in circumstances could alter the position of the
two views. A possible increase in the government's need for revenue could
cause a change in this rule. Such a change would be unfortunate because
this decision allows the parties to work out an intelligent division of their
property prior to a divorce decree without risking a tax burden.
TORTS - GUEST STATUTE - BAR TO CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER
ANTI-HITCHHIKING STATUTE
Two adult hitchhikers solicited a ride from the driver of a motor
vehicle. A wreck occurring soon thereafter, because of the driver's intoxi-
cated condition and reckless operation, brought death to one passenger
and serious injuries to the other. In suits for damages the driver defended
under the Guest Statute.' The Washington Anti-Hitchhiking Statute2
provides that it is unlawful to give transportation as well as to solicit it.
Held, that the guest statute, providing against recovery by an invited
passenger is not made inapplicable by the driver's violation of the anti-
hitchhiking statute. Bateman v. Ursich, 200 P.2d 314 (Wash. l0).
The Washington guest statute, in form and by court interpretation3
follows the pattern of similar statutes and interpretations in approximately
thirty other states.' It is generally agreed that such statutes are in derog-
13. Comm'r v. Barnard's Estate, snura note 10.
14. Harris v. Comm'r, 71 Sup. Ct. 181 (1950).
15. See note 7 Sunra.
16. Harris v. Comm'r, su/ra note 14, at 185.
1. WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6360-121 (1947).
2. WAsn. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6360-100 (1947).
3. Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936); Finn v, Drtina, 30 Wash.
2d 814, 194 P.2d 347 (1948).
4. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut (repealed), Delaware,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, by statute. Georgia,
by court holdings, see Frank v. iorovitz, 52 Ga. App. 651, 183 S.E. 835 (1936); Moore
v. Shirley, 68 Ca. App. 38, 21 S.E.2d 925 (1942).
